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In June of 1784, Thomas Jefferson briefly visited New York City, lodging
at 19 Maiden Lane within a boardinghouse belonging to a Dorothy Elsworth.1
Six years later and after a lengthy stay in Paris as the Minister to France, he
once more found himself on Maiden Lane, feeling the pressing heat of a New
York June. It was the 20th of June, 1790: a Sunday. This time the home was
his own at 57 Maiden Lane, and the mood was rather somber when compared
to six years earlier. In 1784 he had the good fortune of looking ahead to the
sophistication of French society that awaited him on the other side of his
voyage across the Atlantic. This time, however, all he had was a throbbing
headache and the impending reality that if a proper deal were not struck,
and quickly too, that the young United States may very well dissolve after
only a few short years of independence. Despite his headache, which had yet
to subside for nearly a month, Jefferson had arranged a dinner with one of
his closest political allies, James Madison, and with his greatest political foe,
1Jefferson’s Memorandum Book entry for June 5, 1784. Bear, James A. Jr., and Lu-
cia C. Stanton, eds. Jefferson's Memorandum Books: Accounts, with Legal Records and
Miscellany, 1767-1826 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
1
Alexander Hamilton.
The three men convened to engage in a tenuous but necessary discussion
on the nation's economy, specifically on Hamilton's recent attempts to pass
his policy of debt assumption. Hamilton possessed the extraordinary gift of
being a perpetual thorn in the side of Jefferson's political agenda, plagu-
ing the Secretary of State like that set of chronic headaches. As the three
founders concluded their meal and their small talk, they commenced serious
negotiations on the assumption policy, to which both Jefferson and Madison
had been vocal opponents of. After great discussion, Madison pledged to
suspend his active opposition to the policy, proclaiming that “he would not
vote for it, nor entirely withdraw his opposition . . . but leave it to its fate.”
In return, Hamilton was to make a concession of his own. With the politi-
cal backing of the Federalist party, Hamilton agreed to wield his impressive
influence in Congress to appease Madison and Jefferson's southern allies. It
was decided that a rather massive concession needed to be made, as all three
men understood that “the pill would be a bitter one to the Southern states,”
who had little to gain from the policy.
Ultimately the decision made at the dinner table on that Sunday evening
at 57 Maiden Lane was so massive that it not only enticed enough members
of Congress to vote favorably for Hamilton's debt assumption, but it would
also alter the face of American politics for centuries to come. Jefferson later
wrote of the decision to appease the southern states as an attempt to “soothe
them” with “the removal of the seat of government to the Potowmac.” This
measure, shifting the nation's capitol from its original location in Philadel-
phia to its famous location in Washington D.C. symbolically and literally
removed the capitol from the firm grip of northern influence. It also revealed
the immense power and influence wielded by the three individuals who dined
in Jefferson's New York home that evening: three men from two opposing
parties who could relocate a nation's capitol over a meal. What it was not
telling of, however was of the fierce opposition that Jefferson and Hamilton
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had, and how each man's political clout was routinely and savagely bran-
dished toward the other.2
When prompted to search for an early republic illustration of political
friction, historians often turn to the rivalry between Thomas Jefferson and
Alexander Hamilton. Their tale is one that continues to ignite the interest of
scholars, even though it existed well over 200 years into the past. Terminated
with Hamilton's death in 1804 at the hands of Jefferson's own vice president,
Aaron Burr, the feud that had carried on for nearly 14 years would maintain
a lasting influence on American politics for centuries to come. Hamilton,
the nation's first Secretary of the Treasury and undisputedly the most vocal
member of the Federalist party, is most often associated with his vision of
a commercially-attuned America. Both Hamilton and his vision for the na-
tion's future would find firm opposition in the Secretary of State, and later
President, Thomas Jefferson. A leader of the Democratic-Republican party
that would coalesce during the 1790s, Jefferson regularly exchanged political
and personal jabs with Hamilton. It appeared that Hamilton's every political
move was met with opposition from Jefferson, a political behemoth who was
determined to champion his own individualistic and agrarian vision for the
nation.
The tale of this intriguing rivalry is recalled by many prominent politicians
who either fashion themselves as “Jeffersonian” or “Hamiltonian.” Indeed,
as the names suggest, the visions for the American future that these two men
fought over would prevail far beyond their deaths. Their influence would far
exceed their own days, extending them well into the modern day as foun-
tains of guidance and reason for those seeking to follow one visionary path or
the other. It has never been uncommon to look toward the past for insight
into the future, and the rivalry between Jefferson and Hamilton continues
to define popular political understanding regarding the deep-seated nature
2Account and all Jefferson quotes from Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revo-
lutionary Generation (New York: Random House, 2000) 48-49.
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of partisanship. The enmity of the two founding fathers is at times likened
to current political factionalism, especially given their high station within
the opposing Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties. This intense
warring of political factions would eventually culminate in the presidential
election of 1800, which is considered a battle between two of the most li-
belous presidential campaigns ever launched. Jefferson's campaign fired at
Federalist candidate John Adams by accusing him of possessing a “hideous
hermaphroditical character, which has neither the force and firmness of a
man, nor the gentleness and sensibility of a woman.”3 Not to be outdone,
Adams fired back with his own jab, calling Jefferson “a mean-spirited, low-
lived fellow, the son of a half-breed Indian squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto
father.”4 On the ferocity of the entire affair, Jefferson wrote “The storm
through which we have passed, has been tremendous indeed.”5 Although the
disagreements between Jefferson and Hamilton never grew to be as heated as
the slander issued during the election of 1800, a fairly great amount of ani-
mosity was exchanged between them. Partisanship, by 1800, was very much
alive and well, owing much of its good health to the energies of Jefferson and
Hamilton.
Indeed modern-day writers such as Ron Chernow, the author of the 2004
biography Alexander Hamilton, would actually credit the rivalry between
Jefferson and Hamilton as one “so fierce that it would spawn the two-party
system in America.”6 It would become the first of the many following fac-
tionalisms that James Madison had so vehemently opposed in the Federalist
3James Calendar, quoted in Stephen Ambrose, Undaunted Courage (New York: Simon
Schuster, 1996), 65.
4Thomas Robinson Hazard, The Jonny-cake Papers of ”Shepherd Tom” Together with
Reminiscences of Narragansett Schools of Former Days, (Boston: Printed for the sub-
scribers, 1915), 232-233.
5Thomas Jefferson, ”Letter to John Dickinson” (March 6, 1801), quoted in James F.
Simon, What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall and the Epic Struggle to
Create the United States, (New York: Simon Schuster, 2002), 145.
6Ron Chernow, ”The Best of Enemies,” Time Magazine, July 5, 2004. 72. Italics are
mine.
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Papers. A political split that would prevail into current-day politics was
being solidified with each public and private blow issued by these dueling
icons, indicating that political factions received more influence from the ri-
valry than they appeared to contribute. Jefferson, elected to the presidency
in 1800, would include a number of Federalists in his cabinet despite the
volatile and ruinous nature of the campaign launched against him by John
Adams and the Federalist Party. This intriguing lack of partisan politics in
Jefferson's political practice indicates that his disdain for Hamilton and his
policies extended far deeper than the surface of party lines could reveal.
Jefferson himself would hint that in his own perspective Hamilton was an
entity unto himself; to Jefferson he existed entirely separate from other Fed-
eralists. Carried over from his station in office, Jefferson's curious distance
from the partisanship that is so closely associated with this rivalry found
expression as much in his personal writings as it did in public practice. In
The Anas Thomas Jefferson reveals that after a discussion of great length
between himself, Adams, and Hamilton, he had reached the conclusion that
despite their equal allegiance to the Federalist cause, Adams and Hamilton
were men who existed on opposite sides of the “exact line which separated
. . . political creeds.”7 An important distinction between the man and the
political party is thus established, hinting that one of the nation's most divi-
sive and influential political hostilities had been fueled by more than public
politics - it had been shaded by a great deal of personal contempt.
The very matter that provided the first public glimpses of this rivalry
occurred during the distinct solidification of the Federalist and Democratic-
Republican parties: the implementation of Hamilton's economic plan. Re-
cently ascended to the role of the Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton pro-
posed to Congress in 1790 that the federal government institute a policy of
assumption which would relieve the burden of debt on the states and pay
7Thomas Jefferson, “The Anas,” in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jeffer-
son, eds. Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New York: Random House, 2004), 117.
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out in full the face value of securities issued during the Revolutionary War.
To further solve the economic crisis that the new nation was facing, Hamil-
ton made additional suggestions for the establishment of a federally minted
currency and a national bank with which to stabilize the repaired economy.
The matter became a point of particularly aggressive disagreement from Jef-
ferson, who dedicated a great deal of his political effort to publicly oppose
Hamilton's measures.
Writing at length about the differences and similarities between the two
warring founders in his book Jefferson and Hamilton: The Rivalry that
Forged a Nation, author John Ferling points toward their incompatible vi-
sions for the future of America as the crux of their dispute. Assuming that
all areas of their disagreement are influenced equally by the same factors,
Ferling paints a portrait of both Jefferson and Hamilton heavily invested in
preserving a lasting legacy through the nation's future, which would either
be a realization of the agrarian or commercial vision. These visions clashed
on a philosophical front, influenced deeply by each man's convictions regard-
ing democracy, the rights of the individual, and public dissent. Wrapped up
in these conflicting futures is the dispute over Hamilton's economic policies,
which Ferling attributes to the same basis for the rest of their disagreement:
fundamentally discordant beliefs in “the depth and breadth of government
intrusiveness.”8
Given the high political station each man occupied, the rivalry between
Jefferson and Hamilton is often handled as an entirely public affair. Built
up over centuries, these two American visionaries have become defined less
by their rivalry as people and more on the basis of clashing potential ideo-
logical outcomes for the American future. These historical projections often
neglect to take into account one largely important defining characteristic
about these American paragons - the fact that they are, simply put, merely
8John Ferling, Jefferson and Hamilton: The Rivalry that Forged a Nation (New York:
Bloombury Press, 2013), X.
6
human. Though these founders were of an indisputably impressive intellect,
they were not immune to the pettiness of politics, nor did their political
ideologies exist in a vacuum, devoid of their own personal prejudices and
squabbles. While the public aspects of the rivalry certainly cannot be ig-
nored, neither can its immense personal investments. Jefferson's aggressive
opposition may have found its expression in the highly-publicized political
sphere, but its roots extended into deeply personal aspects of Jefferson's life
that invoked concern and wariness. Due to its multifaceted nature, the topic
of Jefferson's immense opposition to Hamilton's early economic policies is
one that I wish to explore. The examination that follows is the brief syn-
thesis and analysis of biographies, private letters, public speeches, and other
publications from Jefferson and Hamilton themselves. A fully cohesive ex-
amination of the deeply personal aspects of their economic dispute remains
pending, but the following pages introduce the great many factors extending
far beyond a single source of political discord that contributed to the fierce
animosity brought to the table on Hamilton's economic policy.
By the time Hamilton took his position as the Secretary of the Treasury,
America was no stranger to disputes regarding the expenditure of funds and
the treatment of debts. As the American people were cementing themselves
ideologically and geopolitically as a nation mere years earlier, it was simul-
taneously fighting a war against British forces while it waged its own series
of internal political and economic battles. With the accumulating debt and
quickly mounting financial pressure, the young nation was operating under
the impotent Articles of Confederation, which granted no control over na-
tional economic policy to the federal legislature. Indeed, the fledgeling United
States was suffering from an acute lack of national economic policy. The sta-
bility of legal tender itself was all but held in disarray and counterfeiting
was both common and widespread. America's economy was nearly defunct,
spiraling out of control in the wake of a costly war that had strained the
financial resources of the states themselves. Congress had neither the legal
7
authority nor the infrastructure to create economic stability. Wholly without
the legal ability to declare any currency as official tender, the powers of the
Continental Congress only extended as far as its influence. Able only to rec-
ommend that the states adopt a uniform currency, Congress was fighting an
uphill battle against states that were reluctant to consolidate power within
an entity that even vaguely reminded them of a monarchy.
As a result of this endemic instability of currency, inflation during the war
skyrocketed, reaching unprecedented levels. By 1781, $100 of paper currency
was required to purchase only $1 worth of silver.9 The new nation was on
the brink of financial collapse, and solutions were desperately being sought.
When Washington named Hamilton as the Secretary of the Treasury in 1790,
the economy was in poor shape. States were bowing under the pressures of
wartime debts and individuals were desperately trading government secu-
rities to pay for food; the incipient nation was facing formidable problems
that required immediate solutions. The immense task was given to the new
Treasury Secretary, who drew heavily on his experience with the Bank of
New York a few years prior. In 1790, Hamilton presented his First Report
on the Public Credit to the new U.S. Congress, calling on the federal govern-
ment to take ownership and action with the nation's economy. His reports
to Congress outlined the necessity to and the means through which the fed-
eral government would assume the debts of each state, pay back government
securities at their full face value, and establish a national bank to regulate
unstable currency. As much as Hamilton's proposal elicited support from
Americans eager for a stronger economy, it brought out an equally powerful
opposing force that was championed by one of Hamilton's own fellow cabinet
members: Thomas Jefferson.
Absent from the country for the four years of turmoil prior to Hamilton's
report, Jefferson returned from his long trip to France in 1790. After suc-
9Harry Carman and Harold C. Syrett, A History of the American People, (New York:
Columbia, 1956), 160.
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ceeding Benjamin Franklin as the Minister to France, Jefferson frequently
expressed his malaise with the political tone of the nation to which he was
finally returning. Writing later of his return, Jefferson would lament that he
had been “but a stranger to the ground, a stranger to the actors on it, so
long absent as to have lost all familiarity with the subject.”10 Given that
he had been far removed from the political machinery of the nation, Jeffer-
son wished to excuse himself from “the most bitter and angry contest ever
known in Congress, before or since the Union of the States.”11 Encountering
a frantic Hamilton while on a stroll in the midst of the savage congressional
division, Jefferson engaged in a discussion with the young Treasury Secre-
tary regarding the current state of affairs. According to Jefferson, Hamilton
“painted pathetically” the condition of the legislature, describing a Congress
so divided that the separation of the states appeared to be an impending
reality.12 Jefferson once more professed his distance from the subject, pro-
claiming: “I was really a stranger of the whole subject . . . not having yet
informed myself of the system of finances adopted, I knew not how far this
[dissolution of states] was a necessary sequence.”13 Sheltering himself from
the political storm, Jefferson thus relinquished any obligation to be invested
in the legislative disarray that had arisen over Hamilton's introduction of
legislation. It would not take him long, however, to form a strong opinion on
the state of economic affairs and political life in the United States. By the
time that Jefferson wrote about Hamilton's economic policies in the years
to follow, his descriptions had become tainted with deeply-held scorn and
contempt. He would readily paint Hamilton as the head of a despotic po-
litical machine, driven by avarice and malice for the American people. This
transformation would be influenced deeply by Jefferson's personal experience
10Jefferson, “The Anas,” in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, eds.
Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New York: Random House, 2004), 114.
11Jefferson, “The Anas,” in Penden, The Life and Selected Writings, 114.
12Ibid., 115.
13Ibid., 115-116.
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with Hamilton as a member of his political cohort.
As an equally prominent politician and a fellow member of George Wash-
ington's cabinet, Hamilton was, first of all, a worthy foe. Jefferson was never
one to shy away from admitting when he was in the presence of intellect, and
he wholeheartedly believed in a “natural aristocracy among men” rooted in
“the grounds of . . . virtue and talents.”14 High in Jefferson's natural aris-
tocracy were those who had earned their position by merit, typically through
cultivating a keen intellect and using the distinctly powerful gift of reason to
raise oneself out of the depths of obscurity. Hamilton's exceptional prowess
of intellectual and political pursuits had grown exponentially since his hum-
ble beginnings as a precocious young boy in the Caribbean, and Jefferson
recognized that his meteoric rise was a product of his sharp wit, which ele-
vated him to a position of great influence within the nation. Jefferson had,
however, reason for concern with Hamilton as his intellectual match. In a
letter penned to James Madison, Jefferson's description of his rival is quite
telling of this truth: “Hamilton is really a Colossus to the anti-republican
party. When he comes forward, there is nobody but yourself who can meet
him.”15 As much as Hamilton's political cunning may have impressed Jeffer-
son, Hamilton's staunch position on the other end of the political spectrum
did more harm than good for Jefferson's respect of him.
An outspoken citizen and a prolific author, Hamilton appeared to be,
in many ways, Jefferson's equal. As a politician, Hamilton was capable of
orchestrating political changes on a massive scale, navigating through the
Constitution that he had advocated for and assisted in crafting. He was
compelling - a proud orator - and he held his beliefs and opinions steadfast
against the tides of opposition that public office promised to bring. Equally
fervent in his own beliefs, Jefferson was like Hamilton in nearly as many
14Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to John Adams,” October 28, 1813.
15Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to James Madison, (September 21, 1795), in The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson, eds. Andrew W. Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh (Washington DC:
1903), 310.
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capacities as he was different. He too was headstrong, dedicated, and well-
read; Jefferson prided himself on his intellect and spent many of his years
ruminating on philosophical notions such as the natures of man, religion, and
politics. Though he was often described as quiet and of a reserved nature,
Jefferson never shrank away from asserting himself through the written word
in manners he was never recorded doing in person. Both Jefferson and Hamil-
ton issued polemics against each other as men and as politicians, employing
heated language and insinuating outrageous claims against each other to
prove their points. As Jefferson launched attacks and counterattacks against
his recently-forged rival, he must have felt his competitive spirit awakened by
the prospect of having an equally-intelligent enemy with which to exchange
blows. Finally encountering a political rival who was worth his salt, Jefferson
was able to engage in a political debate that was as cerebral and philosophi-
cal as it was ferocious and brutal. The ongoing feud, which forced each man
to dig deep within his own knowledge and reason to defend his position, was
certainly a point of intellectual stimulus: an invigorating exercise of wit and
acumen that Jefferson took great relish in.
Given the political vacuum created in the nation's recent break from
colonial rule, the public repartee between Hamilton and Jefferson became
quickly engrossed in the wider political struggle for influence and credibility.
As Hamilton rose to prominence, he also represented a growing potential
threat to Jefferson's own carefully-cultivated political standing. Jefferson,
for a while removed from continental politics, considered Hamilton's rise to
power as a direct challenge to his own political future. Indeed, there was
much for Jefferson to find concern with. The Treasury Secretary, twelve
years younger than Jefferson, had risen quickly through the political ranks
first as a soldier, then as George Washington's aid-de-camp, then a delegate
from New York to the Constitutional Convention, to his eventual post as the
Secretary of the Untied States Treasury. He was charismatic, young, charm-
ing, and most of all, visible. Jefferson had been out of the public's eye for a
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few years, serving as the Minister to France and thus remaining thoroughly
removed from most of America's domestic affairs during those years.
When Jefferson returned to the United States in the late eighteenth
century, his homecoming was not one blanketed in sweeping applause and
widespread admiration from the public. His return was rather humble, per-
fectly fit for a man not yet endowed with the connotation of greatness. Just
as the American public of 1790 had not lionized Jefferson as a national ef-
figy, neither would Hamilton have looked toward him with the reverence
of modern-day Americans. Given Hamilton's own achievements, he had no
motivation to hold Jefferson in higher esteem than he held himself. Heav-
ily invested in domestic politics, Hamilton had blossomed from a precocious
illegitimate child from a small Caribbean island to the Secretary of the Trea-
sury in a few short decades. He had fought in the Revolutionary War against
the British, rose to prominence in the politics of New York, and had written
extensively on the merits of a constitutional government, tirelessly working
behind his pen to convince the young state governments to ratify the new
Constitution. Hamilton, now faced with his largest challenge yet, had been
granted the hopes of the nation in solving the crippling economic crisis. The
young founder had cause for arrogance, and he was not shy for exhibiting it.
Jefferson, though a worthy contributor to politics in his home state, a
member of the Second Continental Congress, and the author of the Dec-
laration of Independence, would not have appeared so large of a figure in
Hamilton's eyes. When he left for North America many years prior, Jef-
ferson was struggling with the loss of his beloved wife Martha. He found
reprieve in his extended visit to France, which provided him with the neces-
sary time for emotional convalescence. The trip had also effectively removed
him from the watchful eye of the American public. Jefferson had partici-
pated in politics well before his departure from the continent, but lacked the
visibility that his Federalist counterpart possessed. Even Jefferson's politi-
cal contributions may have appeared less impressive to Hamilton who was
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relatively young and, living in New York at the time, primarily unconcerned
with Virginia legislation of previous decades.16 These highly personal influ-
ences would bleed over into the political atmosphere between the two men
as Hamilton's quick rise to prominence and his lack of reverence for Jeffer-
son contributed to a widening chasm that would quickly become a point of
serious contention. Observing the growing rift between the two members of
his cabinet, George Washington observed that “Mr. Jefferson fears in Mr.
Hamilton a formidable rival in the competition for the presidential chair at
a future period.”17
In the sense that Hamilton posed a young yet remarkable threat to Jef-
ferson's political future, Washington was correct. The disconnect that they
had begun to establish would persist beyond their pasts or present and into
their visions of the future that laid ahead of them and the nation. Thomas
Jefferson is widely known for his romantic ideal of a nation populated by
the idyllic yeoman farmer. It was an outgrowth of Jefferson's fondness for
self-determination that he hoped would pervade every layer of social and
economic standing. Jefferson's future was truly a vision of the unlimited in-
dependence he hoped would extend from the highest reaches of the American
intellectual elite down to the laboring artisans of the north and the honest
farmers of his Virginian roots in the south. Hamilton, by contrast, favored a
vision of the future that incorporated trade and commerce into the American
fabric. He predicted that a flourishing economy, complete with a multitude of
international economic connections, would ensure the prosperity and health
of the nation that he and Jefferson both fought so hard to solidify. These
irreconcilable visions for the future would become one of Jefferson and Hamil-
ton's most remembered battlegrounds, but it would be an expression rather
than a cause of the deep-seated incompatibility between the two founders.
Jefferson, believing in the purity of a nation built by yeoman farmers,
16Chernow, Ron. Alexander Hamilton. (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 313.
17George Washington, quote from Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 323.
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speculated that the continent possessed “lands enough to employ an infinite
number of people in their cultivation.”18 He found the innocent farmer a vi-
sion of “the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous” Ameri-
can possible, imagining for the nation the potential for an idyllic and peaceful
future.19 Jefferson found fault in the commercialism endemic to Hamilton's
vision for the future, which he frequently derided as cold and corrupt. Built
upon the yeoman farmers who Jefferson understood as “the most valuable
citizens,” a Jeffersonian future envisioned a nation constructed by active cit-
izens who would be “tied to their country and wedded to its liberty and
interests by the most lasting bonds.”20 A vision to which he held steadfast,
Jefferson and his American future were firmly rooted in the independence of
the individual. While Hamilton's commercial America left ample room for
the infringement of an unhindered independent yeoman farmer, there was a
great deal more of Hamilton's vision that Jefferson would find fault in.
While cementing his own persevering world-view, Hamilton had taken
the time to examine at great length, the trends of the British economy. This
strategy, while potentially useful in preparation for the growing reality of an
industrial America, also elicited a fair amount of concern from Americans
who desired as much distance from the British empire as possible. Britain
had long since begun the practice of industrialization and the country was
in a state of social flux, undergoing the transformations that accompany a
quickly morphing economy and society. The trend did not show any signs
of slowing, and Americans like Jefferson looked on with abject horror at the
travesties that growing industry had inflicted upon the working class. In
England, many rural citizens were forced to abandon the practice of farming
to seek work in the cities, their agricultural prospects limited by the increas-
ingly restrictive enclosure movement. The deficiencies of the British model,
18Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to John Jay” (August 23, 1785), in The Declaration of
Independence and Letters, ed. Richard S. Poppen, St. Louis: 1904
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
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coupled with the expansive anti-British sentiment that pervaded the freshly
independent United States, contributed to a deepening opposition to Hamil-
ton's policies.
Yet even as his opponents feared that Hamilton's own economic poli-
cies would plunge many American citizens into the poverty of their British
counterparts, Hamilton did not see the fate of America as a prophecy set in
stone. America's economic future, even if it was built upon the triumphs
and failures of the British model, was not tied entirely to the British path.
In Hamilton's eyes the future of the two economies would remain entirely
separate if America's fragile economy was handled properly. In his Report
on a National Bank, issued in late 1790, Hamilton professed the basis for his
American vision when he described that if “Industry is increased, commodi-
ties are multiplied, agriculture and manufactures flourish: and herein consists
the true wealth and prosperity of a state.”21 Jefferson's yeoman farmer would
not, by Hamilton's prediction, suffer the economic injustices of British citi-
zens who had been trapped by circumstance in a well of poverty. Yet even
when striving toward the same goal of national prosperity as Hamilton was,
Jefferson did not support Hamilton's pro-industrial policies as a foothold
toward that end. The “class of artificers and the panderers of vice” that Jef-
ferson equated with an industrial society were, in his eyes, “the instruments
by which the liberties of a country are generally overturned.”22 Although the
newly-formed union was quite dissimilar to pre-industrial Britain, Jefferson
condemned the imminent reality of industry, dismissing it as an engine for
the corruption of the nation.
It should be noted that no matter however much Jefferson might have
found contention with Hamilton over these clashing agrarian and industrial
foresights, his disdain appears to be directed more toward Hamilton than
toward his economic forecast. During 1790, in the very midst of Hamilton's
21Alexander Hamilton, “Report on a National Bank,” December 13, 1790
22Jefferson, “Letter to Jay”
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efforts to change the tide of the flailing American economy, Jefferson records
his admiration and agreement for the capitalist system in his exclamation:
“I think [Adam] Smith's Wealth of Nations to be the best book extant.”23
Jefferson's exuberance for a book that advocated for the harsh realities of a
free market capitalist society hardly matched his expressions of distrust for
Hamilton's policies, which he had condemned for their lack of protection for
the average citizen. Part of Smith's appeal may have existed in the promise
of independence that was inherent in an un-regulated free market economy.
Jefferson was an eager supporter of individual liberties in the economy, and
his praise of Smith's work suggests that he was in favor of those who ma-
neuvered their way to economic prosperity through their use of reason and
intellect, merits that Jefferson repeatedly bestowed his high praise upon.
This passionate support of unfettered success within a capitalist system,
what could be termed today a sort of economic darwinism, wavered when he
encountered Hamilton's economic policies. With the release of Hamilton's
plan to pay back federal securities at their full face value Jefferson would
rebel against the policy. Jefferson suddenly dismissed speculators who had
used their wits to further themselves economically as unscrupulous while he
denigrated Hamilton for utilizing his own policy to reward his disciples. It
appears that the source of Jefferson's opposition lay not with the policies
themselves, but rather with Hamilton. Jefferson wrote of his foe:
“Hamilton was indeed a singular character. Of acute understanding,
disinterested, and honorable in all private transactions, amiable in
society, and duly valuing virtue in private life, yet so bewitched and
perverted by the British example, as to be under thoro' conviction
that corruption was essential to the government of a nation”24
23Thomas Jefferson, quote from Wish, Harvey. Society and Thought in Early America.
(New York: 1950), 200.
24Thomas Jefferson, quote from Burnstein, ML. Understanding Thomas Jefferson: Stud-
ies in Economics, Law, and Philosophy. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 39.
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While Jefferson would be one of the first to accuse Hamilton of being too
married to the British example, he would certainly not be the last. Historians
have since followed in Jefferson's footsteps, accusing Hamilton of seeking “to
plant the British system in America, corruption and all.”25 This transplan-
tation of British economics was worrisome to Jefferson. The Revolutionary
War had been fought only a short time prior, and the fledgeling nation was
still reeling from the effects of such a sudden break with the British Empire.
The economy Hamilton was attempting to repair was one area of American
society that had sustained particularly heavy damage during the Revolu-
tionary War. In addition to his economic beliefs, Hamilton's political views
served as ammunition for his opponents. Accusals of Hamilton's affection for
British politics aroused cries of monarchism, and Jefferson charged him with
holding a political position that was “a compromise between the two par-
ties of royalism and republicanism.”26 Although finally possessing its own
government, America had not yet abandoned its fears of being once more
subjugated to the whim of a crown. Still new and without precedent, the
American government was in competition with monarchist rule to prove it-
self a superior form of government. Jefferson saw Hamilton's attempts to
consolidate power within the hands of the federal government as intentional
malice toward individuals of the republic, believing that he was scheming
to uphold the system of monarchy that threatened to prevail. The British
system of politics and of government appeared perverse to Jefferson, and he
routinely expressed his disgust for Hamilton's policies, citing their purpose
as the eventual degeneration of America.
In establishing a functioning economic system that would solve the eco-
nomic crisis, Hamilton appears to have borrowed from the examples estab-
lished by the long-serving British Prime Minister Sir Robert Walpole, par-
ticularly those of the Bank of England and the sinking fund, or borrowing
25Forrest McDonald, quote from Burnstein, Understanding Thomas Jefferson, 40.
26Jefferson, “The Anas,” in Penden, The Life and Selected Writings, 112.
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on bonds, as a solution to the instability of the early republic's economy.27
Where Walpole solved the mounting economic crisis facing Britain, Hamil-
ton hoped to do the same. Many years after Hamilton's economic policy was
first introduced, Jefferson expressed disdain for Walpole's role in Britain,
crediting him as the source which “gave the [British] constitution that di-
rection which its defect permitted.”28 He revealed his bias against Walpole,
proclaiming that due to his political presence “morality had been expunged
from [the British] political code.”29 Jefferson no doubt feared that Hamilton,
if he were truly seeking to emulate Walpole's likeness, would also lay waste
to the precious Constitution of the United States.
Through Jefferson's personal writings, one quickly senses that to him
Hamilton was a figure in relentless pursuit of corroding the Constitution.
Jefferson did not appear swayed by Hamilton's devotion to the document
which he had proved instrumental in convincing the states to ratify. With
his vision obscured by Hamilton's British influence, Jefferson believed him-
self to be championing the cause against the man whom he viewed as the
greatest threat to the prosperity of the union. With his own political objec-
tive “to preserve the legislature pure and independent of the executive, [and]
to restrain the administration to republican forms and principles,” Jefferson
represented his rival as the direct opposite.30 The end result was that Jeffer-
son had fashioned himself into a protector of the document and he would “not
permit the Constitution to be construed into monarchy, and to be warped, in
practice, into all the principles and pollutions of [the] favorite English model”
that he equated Hamilton with.31 Jefferson admitted: “here then was the
real ground of the opposition which was made to the course of [Hamilton's]
27Burnstein, Understanding Thomas Jefferson, 40-41.
28Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to James Ronaldson on December 3, 1810,” in The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 4, ed. Henry Augustine Washington (Washington DC: 1853),
554.
29Ibid.
30Jefferson, “The Anas” in Penden, The Life and Selected Writings, 116.
31Ibid.
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administration.”32
Jefferson, fancying himself as the leader of the last bastion against British
influence and the sole upholder of the unadulterated Constitution, found
Hamilton as the perfect figure to vilify for encroaching political injustice.
He portrayed Hamilton as a distilled version of the terrible wrongs of British
society, thus creating his own vision of a man with all of the faults that Jeffer-
son despised for the American nation. Jefferson found his disagreement with
Hamilton on the basis of economics inseparable from his disdain for Hamil-
ton's politics. Attributing both of these aspects of the Treasury Secretary to
British influence made for a powerful figure at which to channel his hatred.
It is difficult to doubt that a portion of Jefferson's disdain for Hamilton came
from his distaste for the British, a distaste that Hamilton was acutely aware
of. In a personal letter, Hamilton wielded his gift for issuing biting jabs,
lambasting Jefferson and Madison with his own shrewd description: “They
have a womanish attachment to France and a womanish resentment of Great
Britain.”33
Despite the ferocity of these exchanges, it is true that Hamilton favored a
more controlled form of government, although perhaps not to the degree that
Jefferson might have interpreted. Fearful that if the individuals might gain
too much power then the nation would fall to disarray and chaos, Hamil-
ton advocated for order through law. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton
expressed his argument for the necessity of government when he observed,
“Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men
will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint.”34
Hamilton's desire for a government capable of restraining its constituents was
born out of his own fears that the union and its precious new Constitution
would corrode, rendering useless all of his efforts in fighting for both. He
was fighting a battle toward the very same end that his opponent, Jefferson
32Ibid.
33Alexander Hamilton, “Letter to Edward Carrington,” (May 26, 1792)
34Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 15,” The Federalist Papers
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was waging his own crusade for: a preservation of the nation. The two men
saw eye to eye on little else, particularly on how that end might be achieved.
Where Hamilton viewed a strong federal government as capable of defending
itself against corruption, Jefferson saw a powerful and nefarious government
ready to strike down its own citizens at will. This intention of federal impo-
sition that is often cast on Hamilton policies, derives its malicious reputation
more from the political atmosphere of its day than from Hamilton's intent.
In fact, Hamilton's strong government served an entirely different purpose
in his plans for America. Within the Federalist Papers, Hamilton professed
his fervent belief that “the executive is a leading character in the definition
of good government,” proving instrumental in “the protection of the com-
munity against foreign attacks,” in the “steady administration of the laws,”
and most importantly as “the security of liberty against the enterprises and
assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.”35
Hamilton mused at great length over the nature of politics and man, and
some of the conclusions that he reached disconcerted Jefferson. In one of his
earliest published works, The Farmer Refuted, Hamilton enumerated that “a
fondness for power is implanted, in most men, and it is natural to abuse
it, when acquired.”36 Statements such as this one concerned Jefferson, who
not only viewed Hamilton as a man making a desperate grab for political
power but also one of complete amorality and utter depravity. Declaring
that “Hamilton was not only a monarchist, but for a monarchy bottomed
on corruption,” Jefferson viewed Hamilton as a source of the corruption that
threatened to poison the well of American politics.37 For all of Hamilton's de-
liberation on man and government, Jefferson routinely overlooks the concern
that his rival possesses for the prevalence of corruption in society. Hamilton
seldom remained quiet on the matter, and he often decried that “a danger-
ous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights
35Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 69,” The Federalist Papers
36Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, 1775
37Jefferson, “The Anas,” in Penden, The Life and Selected Writings, 117.
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of the people than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness
and efficiency of the government.”38 Ironically, both Jefferson and Hamilton
would have found agreement with these words, each fancying himself the lat-
ter and his rival as the former.
Similar quotes would shade Hamilton as not only a dangerous Federal-
ist to Jefferson, but as a corrupt politician who favored the unscrupulous
in his policies. Hamilton's assumption policy was a source of particularly
suspicious motive for his opponents. Jefferson accused Hamilton of using the
policy to garner political support for himself and possibly, as Washington
suggested, to impede Jefferson's opportunity to someday become president.
After carefully maneuvering the various interests of Congress and rallying
support from both the northern and southern states, Jefferson watched with
exasperation as the Assumption was passed. He would later lament that
the twenty million dollars approved by Congress was to be “divided among
favored States, and thrown in as a pabulum to the stock-jobbing herd.”39
These 'favored states' did not include Virginia, Jefferson's home state, and
this exclusion no doubt carried with it a great deal of sting. At the same
time, Jefferson worried that the policy of assumption “added to the number
of votaries to the Treasury, and made its chief the master of every vote in
the legislature,” giving rise to the concern that this fact “might give to the
government the direction suited to [Hamilton's] political views.”40
The stakes were rising for Jefferson, a man who not only saw his po-
litical potential being limited by this sudden foe but also the future of the
nation endangered. He worried that Hamilton was using his position to help
speculators who had purchased the nation's security bonds for a fraction of
their face value when struggling bond holders became cornered by poverty
and circumstance. Jefferson sympathized with the men who had sold their
securities in desperation, acknowledging that “during the war the greatest
38Alexander Hamilton, quote from Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, 253.
39Jefferson, “The Anas” in Penden, The Life and Selected Writings, 115-116.
40Ibid., 115-116.
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difficulty we encountered was the want of money or means to pay our soldiers
. . . our farmers, manufacturers, and merchants.”41 Wanting to track down
the original bond holders, Jefferson attempted to channel funds to the poor
and needy. Acknowledging that while it would have been ideal, Hamilton
understood that without proper receipts of sale it would be impractical if
not utterly impossible to track down the original holder of each and every
security, especially given the amount of time that had passed since they were
issued. Instead opting for the only route possible, which was to pay current
security holders for the face value of each bond, Hamilton was forced to make
the unpopular choice. This did not bode well for his reputation with Jeffer-
son, who decried that he had played an important role in allowing “immense
sums [to be] filched from the poor and ignorant.”42 Because some speculators
had profited handsomely from the policy, which was unfavorable to many of
Jefferson's yeoman farmers, he accused Hamilton of using the Assumption
to gain political favor, claiming that “men thus enriched by the dexterity of
a leader would follow of course the chief who was leading them to fortune,
and become the zealous instruments of all his enterprises.”43
Jefferson continued to berate Hamilton for his policy, this time attacking
the principle of borrowing to pay the securities. Similar to the payment of
bonds, Hamilton's policy of willingly creating a deficit to stimulate the econ-
omy was vilified by Jefferson, who exclaimed that “the more debt Hamilton
could rake up, the more plunder [there was] for his mercenaries.”44 Jefferson
also accused Hamilton of stealing from the funds provided by Congress, ex-
plicitly stating that Hamilton “pretended” to spend money that he claimed
was “for general purposes and ought therefore to be paid from the general
purse.”45 Jefferson at times keenly misinterprets his rival, perhaps assuming
41Ibid.,113.
42Ibid.
43Ibid.
44Ibid., 114.
45Ibid.
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that Hamilton was speaking of himself when he made statements about the
influence of self-interest. Jefferson accused Hamilton of advocating for the
Assumption under the guise of self-interest, of exhibiting his favor for spec-
ulators by refusing to track down the original owners of each security, and
of effectively buying his power and prestige through his reward of corrupt
speculators.
To Jefferson, corruption could be scourged from politics with enough ded-
ication and careful action. In Hamilton's eyes, such hope for political purity
was little more than an ivory tower. Hamilton believed that such an ide-
ological utopia was unattainable given the inherent vice of humanity that
was self-interest. Operating under this assumption it can be gleaned that if
Jefferson were an idealist, then Hamilton was a pragmatist. Hamilton's own
words on the nature of speculators and other men driven by greed and avarice
reveal a pained disappointment at the realities of man and his relationship
to wealth:
“As riches increase and accumulate in few hands, as luxury prevails in
society, virtue will be in a greater degree considered as only a graceful
appendage of wealth, and the tendency of things will be to depart from
the republican standard. This is the real disposition of human nature;
it is what neither the honorable member nor myself can correct. It is
a common misfortunate that awaits our State constitution, as well as
all others.”46
Jefferson found great fault in Hamilton's view of man, for his vision of
the one true human nature was one that assumed the better in individuals.
Hamilton, perhaps jaded, possessed no qualms in admitting that he believed
“a fondness for power is implanted in most men, and it is natural to abuse
it when acquired.”47 Hamilton's rising influence, coupled with Jefferson's
46Alexander Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratifying Convention, June 24-25, 1788.
47Hamilton, “The Farmer Refuted.”
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belief that his enemy was a self-interested elitist, proved effective in creating
a villain of Hamilton. Jefferson and his allies appeared dedicated to defacing
Hamilton's policies and worth as a politician, furious over the economic real-
ities of the nation. While they painted a portrait of the Treasury Secretary
as a man bent on crucifying the individuals of the nation, Hamilton's own
words do not reveal the same pretensions to unbounded corruption and to
ignoring the needs of the nation's citizens.
Hamilton believed that man and government inhabited a peculiar rela-
tionship, though it was not quite the one that Jefferson condemned him for.
With a token self-interest, Hamilton believed man's drive toward conceit not
as a simple issue or right or wrong. Indeed, he was not shy in describing
how he saw it best for the nation to forge a fatal flaw into a triumphant
strength. In his speech to the New York Ratifying Convention, Hamilton
narrated: “Men will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change human
nature as to oppose the strong current of the selfish passion. A wise legislator
will gently divert the channel and direct it, if possible, to the public good.”48
Hamilton repeatedly espoused his opinions on the functions of the state and
its constituents. In the Federalist Papers he stressed the importance on the
consent of the governed, believing that “the fabric of American empire ought
to rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people.”49 The latter half of
this statement appears to be of little consequence to Jefferson in matters of
absolving Hamilton's accused monarchism. It is not possible to rely on the
excuse that Jefferson had not read these essential words, for he had, in a
letter to Madison, belayed his appreciation for the collection of texts. Dated
for November of 1788, Jefferson wrote in his letter that the Federalist Papers
were “the best commentary on the principles of government which ever was
written.”50 Though Madison was a contributor too, the letter was penned at
48Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratifying Convention.
49Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 22,” The Federalist Papers.
50Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to James Madison on September 21, 1795,” in The Writings
of Thomas Jefferson, eds. Andrew W. Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh (Washington DC:
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least two years before Jefferson would publicly make a rival out of Hamilton,
whom he had likely not met at the time. Hamilton's contributions to the
Federalist Papers were not the only instance in which he had expressed sim-
ilar ideas. During a speech to the New York Ratifying Convention in 1788,
he proclaimed that “good constitutions are formed upon a comparison of the
liberty of the individual with the strength of the government: if the tone of ei-
ther be too high, the other will be weakened too much.”51 Aware of the fears
that Americans possessed regarding a strong government, in the same speech
Hamilton acknowledged the concern and dispelled it by asserting that “the
government will reach, in its regular operations, the perfect balance between
liberty and power.”52 There is no indication that Jefferson was made aware
of this particular speech, but with the prolific nature of Hamilton's writing
and the frequency with which he attempts to banish the prejudices against
federal authority, it is unlikely that Jefferson could not be aware of Hamil-
ton's views regarding the topic of protecting the liberties of the individual.
What is more likely is that Jefferson found cause for alarm in Hamilton's
repeated defense of federal power, which he thought suspiciously similar to
the monarchist rule of Britain that the nation had only just escaped form.
With Hamilton on the offensive, pushing through his economic policies in the
early 1790s, Jefferson unveiled his most compelling piece of evidence against
the strengthening of federal power. It was the very document that Hamilton
had fought for so vehemently in the public arena: the Constitution.
If Jefferson could successfully paint Hamilton as the villain to the Consti-
tution, then he could produce a relatively sound case for stopping the passage
of Hamilton's national bank. Whether Jefferson truly believed his assertions
or not is unclear, but his public wielding of the document reveals a deep
understanding that the precedent of constitutional interpretation had not
yet been set. Jefferson knew that this precedent, in which ever direction it
1903)
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would be established, would have long-reaching effects in directing the future
of American politics. Hamilton had a similar knowledge about the Constitu-
tion's power, enumerating that it is “the standard to which we are to cling.
Under its banners, bona fide must we combat our political foes.”53 Although
Hamilton's dedication to the Constitution was demonstrated in his passion-
ate defense of the document, Jefferson continued to maintain his suspicions.
He found cause for contention in Hamilton's interpretation of the document.
Split over the merits of interpretation, Hamilton favored the Constitution
as a document intended to live and breathe through a manner of interpre-
tation; it was a founding document that he hoped would be changed and
perfected as society demonstrates its need for alteration. Jefferson, leading
the opposition, believed the Constitution to be utterly dependent upon the
explicitness of its amendments. Of particular importance to Jefferson was
the tenth amendment, which limits the powers of Congress to those specif-
ically enumerated within the document. Without this necessary limitation,
he feared that the nation would crumble and give way to monarchy. Jefferson
expressed these concerns in his official opinion on the constitutionality of the
First Bank of the United States, stating that “to take a single step beyond the
boundaries thus specifically drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take
possession of a boundless field of power, not longer susceptible of any def-
inition.”54 Constitutional interpretation was, in Jefferson's eyes, a slippery
slope. Written in response to Hamilton's proposal for the establishment of
a national bank, Jefferson's published opinion sought to slander Hamilton's
policies in any way possible. He launched a virulent attack on the policy,
taking particular aim at the constitutionality of his proposal.
As distressed as Jefferson was over Hamilton's broad-constructionist in-
terpretation of the Constitution, he expressed his increased consternation
53Alexander Hamilton, Letter to James Bayard April, 1802
54Thomas Jefferson, “Official Opinion of Thomas Jefferson in 1791, Upon the Estab-
lishment of a National Bank,” in Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives
at the First Session of the Twenty-Second Congress, Vol II (Washington DC: 1831)
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when that interpretation was translated into action with the establishment of
the First National Bank of the United States. Elevating his argument to the
highest arena of political contention, Jefferson turned to the Constitution for
backing. Constructing a sophisticated argument, Jefferson relied heavily on
the precursory assumption of a strict-constructionist approach, attacking the
manner in which Hamilton appeared to be stretching the bounds of congres-
sional power and thus infringing on the rights of the state and of the individ-
ual. For guidance Jefferson looked to the tenth amendment, which proclaims
that “all powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people.”55
The tenth amendment was Jefferson's “foundation of the Constitution” and
the basis of his argument was rooted in Hamilton's gross violation of it.56
Jefferson's interpretation of the Constitution left no space for the incorpora-
tion of a federal bank into the powers of the United States government, and
the powers granted to the federal government through Hamilton's bill were
not explicitly “delegated to the United States by the Constitution” and were,
by extension, expressly prohibited through the tenth amendment.57 To de-
viate from the dictates of the amendment even once was “to take possession
of a boundless field of power;” Jefferson recognized that the nation stood on
the precipice of establishing a dangerous new precedent, one that he feared
would have dire consequences for the future of America.58
Secondary to his argument against the establishment of the bank, Jeffer-
son unleashes yet another claim directed at Hamilton's unconstitutionality.
Jefferson approached the matter by attacking not only the man, but the pol-
icy. He raised the issue of constitutionality, asking why the bank should be
established by the federal government if it was not necessary to the function-
ing of the state. Predicting Hamilton's defense of the bill, Jefferson attacks
55Tenth Amendment, quoted in Jefferson, “Official Opinion.”
56Jefferson, “Official Opinion.”
57Ibid.
58Ibid.
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the importance of the bank and paints the institution as a trivial improve-
ment to daily life at best - certainly not one worth violating the integrity of
the Constitution for. He founded this portion of his argument against the
bill's creation of a national mint, a curious choice since Article 1, Section
8 of the Constitution provided the federal Congress with the power to coin
money. Jefferson agreed that “indeed bank bills may be a more convenient
vehicle than treasury orders,” but insisted that a want for convenience did
not equate to necessity, especially in matters which requires constitutional
interpretation to find “ground for assuming any non-enumerated power.”59
Anticipating defense of this 'convenience,' Jefferson retorts:
“It may be said that a bank whose bills would have a currency all
over the States would be more convenient than one whose currency
is limited to a single State. So it would be still more convenient that
there should be a bank, whose bills should have a currency all over
the world. But it does not follow from this superior conveniency, that
there exists anywhere a power to establish such a bank; or that the
world may not go on very well without it.”60
To improve upon this argument against convenience, Jefferson draws on the
example of the state bank in Philadelphia which “does . . . business by
their post-notes” through compliance with the United States Treasury and
state collectors.61 A process he deemed effective enough, Jefferson believed
that Philadelphia's example would prove thorough in preventing “the exis-
tence of that necessity which can honestly justify [the national bank].”62 In
incorporating this example of state banking into his argument, Jefferson was
effectively conveying his concern that the creation of a national bank would
be an infringement on the business and the rights of the state banks. His
59Ibid.
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anxiety over the states reflected a similar attention to the individuals of the
nation, whose rights he often believed Hamilton to be dismissive of. Jefferson
worried that “the bill delivers [Americans] up bound to the national bank”
that would limit the rights of the individuals to choose “to employ any other
bank,” what Jefferson viewed as a distinct violation of not only the individ-
ual and the Constitution, but also the freedom afforded to American banks
under the practice of a completely laissez-faire economy.63
By proposing that the United States establish a national bank, Hamil-
ton was not only breaching the inviolable basis of Jefferson's constitutional
interpretation; Jefferson also understood him to be perverting the enumer-
ated powers of Congress for his own cause, specifically those on taxation and
the production of currency. Jefferson posited that “to erect a bank and to
regulate commerce are very different acts,” drawing a parallel between the
actions of the federal government and the actions of the individual citizen
that he sought to protect.64 The bank, creating “a subject of commerce in its
bills,” was no different to Jefferson than the average American “who makes a
bushel of wheat, or digs a dollar out of the mines.”65 As a private entity, the
bank would have no more ability to regulate commerce than Jefferson's yeo-
man farmer. Hamilton's bank would thus be in violation of the Constitution
under Jefferson's strict-constructionist interpretation, for the powers granted
to Congress do “not extend to the internal regulation of the commerce of a
state (that is to say of the commerce between citizen and citizen).”66 To
force such an unwarranted expansion of Congressional power would be, Jef-
ferson's eyes, an infringement on the rights of the individual. Hamilton might
have instead described the expansion as economically beneficial to the citi-
zens who would be free to reap the benefits of a stable, federally-regulated
economy. Yet if Jefferson's suspicions were correct and Hamilton was truly
63Ibid.
64Ibid.
65Ibid.
66Ibid.
29
as intent on seizing control of the nation through his influence in Congress,
then defending against the expansion of congressional power was absolutely
vital to Jefferson's task of protecting the nation.
Just as he opposed a federal currency, Jefferson would find a similar fault
too in the levy of taxes for Hamilton's bill. Concern over his rival's assump-
tion policy was echoed in Jefferson's opposition to the bank, fearing that
increased political power for Hamilton would be bought using the dollars of
the taxpaying American people. The powers of Congress were intended to
“provide for the general welfare” of the nation, a function that Jefferson ac-
knowledges and links directly to taxation, and which he enumerated as the
sole condition for Congress to levy a tax.67 To Jefferson, the ability to levy
taxes was a potentially dangerous power that Congress possessed, and it was
not one that ought to be taken lightly. While he never disputes the func-
tion of taxation in improving the nation, he does challenge the grounds upon
which Congress' power to impose taxes rests. Because Jefferson's margins for
constitutional interpretation were quite narrow, Hamilton's policies appeared
to directly attack the integrity of the document. By attempting to improve
the general welfare of the American people through any means other than
taxation, such as through the establishment of Hamilton's national bank,
the exercise of Congressional power without the constitutional limits that
restrain it to taxation alone would render Congress as “a distinct and inde-
pendent power to do any act they please.”68 Even if those acts were for the
expressed benefit of the nation, Jefferson opposed to expansion of implied
constitutional powers for fear that it would “render all the preceding and
subsequent enumerations of power completely useless.”69 Under Jefferson's
interpretation, that meant barring the passage of Hamilton's bill, halting
the creation of a national bank, and not allowing Congress to interpret their
powers beyond what the Constitution explicitly states. Even if Jefferson be-
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68Ibid.
69Ibid.
30
lieved that Hamilton's bank would have been established for the good of the
nation and not simply for a vicious self-interest, or that the bank itself would
have evolved to provide something beyond mere conveniences, he may still
have felt opposed to the entire affair for fear that the powerful precedent
these actions would unleash might someday become perverted, perhaps even
sooner rather than later by the politically-savvy Treasury Secretary.
A large discrepancy between these two men on the constitutionality of
the First National Bank of the Untied States lies in the nature of the rela-
tionship they perceived to exist between government and the Constitution.
Where Jefferson saw the bank and congressional interpretation as seriously
undermining of the Constitution, Hamilton saw his centralized government
actively functioning to fortify the nation. For Hamilton, the bank represented
the realization of everything he had hoped the federal government could be:
strong, practical, and productive. In Hamilton's eyes, the bank was a gift
to the American people that would stabilize their economy and ensure pros-
perity for the entirety its twenty-year charter. Jefferson saw it as the exact
opposite: a detriment to the nation and the catalyst for the corrosion of
the Constitution. Little did he expect, but the precedent established in the
exercise of Congress's implied powers would pave the way for him during his
presidency, during which his strict-constructionist view of the Constitution
would waver in favor of securing the Louisiana Purchase. Jefferson's strict-
constructionism did not automatically force him to assume an aversion to
altering the document. On the contrary, Jefferson would demonstrate his
advocacy for radical and frequent change, which he saw as an indication that
the individuals of the United States were engaged in the civic elements of
their nation.70 Jefferson simply did not approve of that change enacting it-
self quickly and mercilessly through the interpretations of Congress, favoring
instead a process of amendment that would limit the exertion of individual
70David N. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson, (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 1994), 302.
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influence, such as that regularly exercised by Hamilton himself.71
With contending interpretations over the Constitution itself and the man-
ner through which to effect constitutional change, Jefferson and Hamilton
were already at odds. Combined with the growing political threat that
Hamilton posed to his rival, Jefferson found a certain villain in his oppo-
nent. Hamilton was setting a dangerous precedent that sought not to create
a nation bound taut to the word of the Constitution, as Jefferson would wish
it, but rather one that found the document's enumerations as a starting
point. It was to Hamilton a guide for the growth of a nation that was only in
its nascent stage rather than a binding political form of scripture. This inter-
pretation, regardless of Hamilton's intent, must have appeared dangerous to
Jefferson who saw his influential opponent creating an avenue through which
he could enact any policies he wished to. In Jefferson's mind he was not only
against the implementation of an idea that could potentially undermine the
rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, but also against a man
who consistently encroached on his political influence and evoked from Jeffer-
son a visceral reaction of dislike. The threat that Hamilton's policies posed
must have been immense in Jefferson's eyes: a culmination of his dislike of
the man, the policies, and the endangerment of his own political standing.
What was ultimately at stake was the future, and Jefferson did not want to
place any portion of it within the control of Hamilton, whom he feared would
sacrifice the nation as he solely sought political gain for himself. This is not
to say that Hamilton's policies would have undermined that future with any
certainty, but in Jefferson's vilification of his rival it would seem a logical
conclusion of events. To oppose Hamilton was to do right by himself, the
Constitution, and the nation.
Hamilton would have seen himself as carrying out a similarly positive,
though starkly different, narrative. Jefferson's vehement opposition could be
interpreted as a treacherous impediment to the realization of the nation's full
71Mayer, Constitutional Thought, 296.
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potential, equal in magnitude to the threat that Hamilton himself appeared
to pose in his rival's eyes. For all of his optimistic visions for the future,
Hamilton hoped that the nation would not be hindered by the self-interest
that ran rampant throughout its population. After the successful adoption
of the Constitution, a politically necessary vehicle to Hamilton's stabilized
nation, the nation was in an auspicious state. The future of the United States
was still in a precarious position, however, without a stable economy. Hamil-
ton had fought hard to create the centralized federal government that he had
envisioned, and through its new powers he sought to establish a precedent
of functionality and strength for the nation. Concerned with the emergent
government, the nation as an entity, and with the ability of the nation to
continue on despite human corruption, Hamilton's economic policies were
crafted in the manner that he believed most suited for the security of the
nation.
As these two men were working against each other, they were also working
for a common goal. Though each was attempting to edge the nation toward a
prosperous future, the gulf dividing their methods and beliefs were immense.
For all of Jefferson's efforts, there appeared to be an equal push from the
industrial Hamilton to foil his hard-fought progress toward an agrarian Amer-
ican future.These conflicting visions of the future were rooted in the rivalry
rather than the source of it. Jefferson and Hamilton certainly sought to sep-
arate themselves publicly in ideas and methods, and this push was prompted
by deeply-held feelings of personal contempt. For Hamilton, feelings of ri-
valry were no doubt influenced by the intense opposition from Jefferson, who
seemed against him at every turn. Jefferson's feelings were shaded by a mul-
titude of influences which found themselves expressed in his political actions
against his rival. In many ways, Hamilton was the perfect enemy. He was
that rare figure whom Jefferson could feel simultaneous respect and loathing
toward. For all of Hamilton's admirable intellect and the competitive spirit
that he inspired within Jefferson, there was still a great deal of animosity
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that he evoked from his opponent. As the author of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and a staunch defender of liberty from behind the pen, Jefferson
had a wealth of personal reasons to be deeply opposed to Hamilton, who
drew often on the British example when crafting his policies. The promotion
of an economic structure built upon British influence may have appeared as
a manner through which America's new foundation of independence could be
undermined by the empire they had recently broken from. Hamilton's own
arrogance and disregard for Jefferson might have contributed to the growing
distance between the two founders, which was furthered by their match in
intellect but disconnect in political philosophy. The political discord itself
was rooted within personal antagonism, breeding what became the public
disagreements on the nature of government and economics. Fueled by the
personal aspects of the disagreement, the rivalry became highly public when
it was elevated to the political arena with disputes regarding the merits of
Hamilton's economic policy, but it never lost its distinctly personal influ-
ences. Jefferson saw Hamilton's readiness to institute an economic policy
that acknowledged and played on endemic human self-interest as an indica-
tion that Hamilton too was acting solely for self gain.
To Jefferson it seemed that his rival was, although high on that natu-
ral aristocracy due to his intellect, manipulating the laws the Constitution
for his own benefit. This suspicion no doubt rose from Jefferson's personal
impressions of Hamilton, who was never eager to accept Jefferson's opinions
on his economic policy. With the battle regarding the constitutionality of
Hamilton's proposals, Jefferson appeared to be more concerned with limiting
Hamilton's political power than he was worried about government intrusion,
which simply supported his argument against Hamilton's sprawling influence.
Allowing Congress to pass the economic policies would set a precedent that
would not only allow for avenues to change other than constitutional amend-
ment, but a precedent that would also allow for Hamilton to push through
more of his proposals and garner far more political support than Jefferson
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wished him to. Given Hamilton's indisputable belief in the inherently self-
interested nature of man, Jefferson had cause for concern that Hamilton's
own self-interest was the driving force behind his political crusades. Even
if this was not Hamilton's intention, the powerful concoction of influential
personal factors meant that little could be done to sway Jefferson's opinion
of his opponent. The evidence from Hamilton and Jefferson themselves in-
dicate that this great rivalry, one that has grown to define an era, was never
based solely in public political matters. Personal opinion and prejudice drove
a wedge between these two founders, who elevated a dispute rooted in pri-
vate disagreement all the way up to two of the most public arenas: Congress
and print. This rivalry that would come to define a nation with its conflict-
ing visions of American prosperity, its varying positions on constitutional
interpretation, and its warring founders, would remain a deeply personal
matter between Hamilton and Jefferson. For all that they have been built
up throughout history as larger-than-life figures and beacons of inspiration,
these two men were, at the very core of it all, human.
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